Recently, Liaw et al. proposed a remote user authentication scheme using smartcards. They claimed a number of features of their scheme, e.g. a dictionary of verification tables is not required to authenticate users; users can choose their password freely; mutual authentication is provided between the user and the remote system; the communication cost and the computational cost are very low; users can update their password after the registration phase; a session key agreed by the user and the remote system is generated in every session; and the noncebased scheme which does not require a timestamp (to solve the serious time synchronization problem) etc.
Introduction
In insecure communication network a remote user authentication is a tool to authenticate remote users. Remote user authentication is a process by which a remote system gains access to the remote resources.
In 1981,Lamport [5] proposed a password based remote user authentication scheme using password tables to verify the remote user over insecure communication channel. That scheme was not fulfilling the security requirements in current senario. Since the Lamport's scheme , several remote user authentication schemes and improvements [1] , [3] , [4] , [6] , [8] have been proposed with and without smart cards. Some of these schemes are also discussed in a survey [7] . Recently, Liaw et al. [6] proposed a remote user authentication scheme using smart cards. Their scheme has claimed a number of features , e.g. a dictionary of verification tables is not required to authenticate users; users can choose their password freely; mutual authentication is provided between the user and the remote system; the communication cost and the computational cost are very low; users can update their password after the registration phase; a session key agreed by the user and the remote system is generated in every session; and the nonce-based scheme which does not require a timestamp (to solve the serious time synchronization problem) etc. In this paper We show that Liaw et al.'s scheme has many security holes and is completely insecure.
The Liaw et al.'s scheme
The scheme consists of five phases: registration, login, verification, session and password change.
Registration phase
A new user U i submits identity ID i and password P W i to the remote system for registration. The remote system computes U i 's secret information v i = h(ID i , x) and e i = v i ⊕ P W i , where x is a secret key maintained by the remote system and h(·) is a secure one-way hash function. Then the remote system writes h(·) and e i into the memory of a smart card and issues the card to U i .
Login phase
When U i wants to log into the remote system, he/she inserts the smart card into the terminal and enters ID i and P W i . The smart card then performs the following operations:
L1. Generate a random nonce N i and compute
L2. Send the login message < ID i , C i , N i > to the remote system.
Verification phase
To check the authenticity of < ID i , C i , N i >, the remote system checks the validity of 
Session phase
This phase involves two public parameters q and α where q is a large prime number and α is a primitive element mod q. The phase works as follows: S1. The remote system computes S i = α Ns mod q and sends S i to the smart card. The smart card computes W i = α Ni mod q and sends W i to the remote system. S2. The remote system computes K s = (W i ) Ns mod q and, the smart card computes K u = (S i ) Ni mod q. It is easy to see that K s = K u . Then, the card and the remote system exchange the data using the session key and e i .
Password change phase
With this phase U i can change his/her P W i by the following steps:
S2
. Update e i on the memory of smart card to set e ′ i .
3 Security Weaknesses 1. In registration phase user U i submits its identity ID i and Password P W i to the remote system. Medium of communication is not described. Is it secure or insecure. In real problems, user normally uses insecure channel. In such case password P W i is reveled to adversary A in between.
2. In Login phase, when user U i keys his identity ID i and Password P W i , smartcard computes a login message < ID i , C i , N i >, Where N i is a random nonce and
This login message travels through insecure public channels. The adversary A can intercepts the valid login request < ID i , C i , N i >. Now, with this infomation, advesary A can play replay attack. He sends < ID i , C i , N i > to the remote system at any time, as a login request . To validate < ID i , C i , N i >, the remote system does the following:
-Checks the validity of ID i .
. Note this point, there is no check at the server side which prevents the reuse of nonce N i , which was already used in some previous login. Thus the server is unable to decide whether the C i is coming from a legitimate user or from an adversary. It is obvious that system authenticates the login request.
-The remote system generates a nonce N * s and encrypts the message M = E v ′ i (N i , N * s ), then sends < M > back to the communicating party (that is advesary A here and is impersonating the legtimate user).
-Now, A will just reply 'OK' and will enjoy the access to the remote system. Therefore, ultimately the concept of mutual authentication fails on both side.
3. In above paragraph, adversary A, has knowledge of login request < ID i , C i , N i >. If he is able to access user's smartcard any how, he can recover the infomation e i , which is stored on smartcard. Now having knowledge of C i and e i , the adversary can perform offline attack, as he knows Three variables of the equation 
Conclusion
In this paper, we have shown various security holes of the Liaw et al.'s scheme.
